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This article approaches corporate reputation from an English law perspective. It argues that 
corporate reputation is at least as important as individual reputation, as it is not only vital for 
the health and prosperity of businesses themselves (whether large or small), but also for the 
communities within which they operate. Following analysis of conflicting jurisprudence from 
the European Court of Human Rights, which has led to a lack of clarity within English law, 
this paper contends that business reputation should be subsumed within the concept of 
property. Such an approach would then enable businesses to avail themselves of a positive 
right to the protection of reputation, as property, under Article 1 Protocol 1 of the European 
Convention of Human Rights.  
 
I Introduction  
In his excellent Journal of Media Law article entitled ‘Corporate Reputation under the 
European Convention on Human Rights’ David Acheson persuasively argues, inter alia, that 
Article 1 Protocol 1 (A1P1) does not and should not protect corporate reputation.1 This article 





offers a rejoinder to this argument. It contends that, as it currently stands, English defamation 
law may be vulnerable to challenge under the European Convention on Human Rights 
(ECHR) as it only protects corporate reputation where, pursuant to sec 1(2) of the 
Defamation Act 2013, the claimant is able to establish that they have suffered, or that they are 
likely to suffer, serious financial loss as a result of the alleged defamatory statement(s). 
Whether the 2013 Act complies with the ECHR depends on whether corporate reputation is 
protected as ‘property’ under A1P1. Contrary to Acheson’s view, this article argues that a 
company’s right to reputation should be subsumed within the concept of reputation as 
property and should, therefore, enable corporations to avail themselves of a positive right to 
the protection of reputation, as property, under A1P1. This is because, as set out in section II, 
reputation is clearly an asset of tangible value for companies. Consequently, damage caused 
to reputation can have a huge detrimental impact on the prosperity and health of not only the 
companies themselves but, also, the communities within which they are located and the wider 
economy. As companies can benefit from ECHR rights,2 it argues that it is surely right that 
legal mechanisms exist to enable corporations to protect this vital asset. However, despite the 
importance of corporate reputation the ability of companies to protect their reputation, by 
virtue of a positive Convention right pursuant to A1P1, as opposed to reliance on Article 10 
ECHR, is controversial and is subject to equivocal European Court of Human Rights 
(ECtHR) jurisprudence that has led to confusion within English law.  
 This article begins at section II, which sets out what is meant by ‘corporate 
reputation’ and provides analysis of its value to both companies and society. Section III 
explains why, despite having historic roots, the right of corporations to sue in defamation is 
                                                          
1 D Acheson, Corporate Reputation under the European Convention on Human Rights (2018) 10 Journal of 
Media Law (JML) 49. 




controversial. This leads into section IV which discusses the concept of the right to reputation 
as property. Specifically, this section argues that the notion of property is dynamic and is 
inextricably linked to societal development and change. It is contended that this provides 
conceptual support for the argument that reputation can be protected through the medium of 
the ‘property concept’.  Section V explains why a positive right to corporate reputation, 
protected by virtue of A1P1, is preferable to it being merely a permissible justification for 
restricting free speech. Section VI provides analysis of the ECtHR’s equivocal case law on 
this and why this has led to confusion within an English law context. Finally, section VII 
concludes the article by submitting what the preferred position in respect of the protection of 
reputation as property should be. 
 
II What’s in a name? The value of corporate reputation  
A What is meant by corporate reputation? 
As will become evident below, scholarship relating to the reputation of companies, within a 
variety of disciplines, commonly refers to ‘corporate reputation’ as a term of reference. For 
the sake of clarity, and for the purpose of this article, corporate reputation relates to the 
reputation of any ‘body’ that trades for profit.3 Thus, it encapsulates the entire spectrum of 
corporate entities, from limited companies and limited liability partnerships, including sole 
traders and small firms, up to multi-national public limited companies (PLCs). 
B The value of corporate reputation 
Large companies are at the forefront of the economy, society and politics. The senior officers 
of these organisations are, very often, closely allied to the government of the day and, as a 
                                                          




result, their views and preferences have the potential to influence policy and ministerial 
decisions.4 Accordingly, in Jameel v Wall Street Journal Europe Sprl (Jameel)5 Baroness 
Hale stated that ‘the power wielded by multi-national corporations is enormous and growing’ 
and that the ability to criticise large companies ‘may be at least as important in a democracy 
as the freedom to criticise the government’.6  
Conversely, notwithstanding Baroness Hale’s comments, providing companies with the 
mechanisms to protect their reputation is also extremely important. Arguably, the need for 
such a mechanism is particularly acute in the context of smaller companies, such as sole 
traders and small partnerships. As discussed below, these organisations are not only, very 
often, inextricably linked to, and embedded within, their local communities, but do not have 
the same financial, marketing and public relations resources to absorb attacks on their 
reputation as compared to larger companies. Consequently, a statement that negatively affects 
the reputation of a small company could cause it severe or even fatal damage.7  
                                                          
4 For example, in 2010, the Conservative and Liberal Democrat coalition government announced the creation of 
a Business Advisory Group, consisting of industry leaders, to assist the Prime Minister and senior ministers with 
‘high level’ business and economic advice. The group operated until 2016: 
<https://www.gov.uk/government/news/business-advisory-group-announced>. In 2017 the government set up a 
similar group to advise on Brexit: <https://www.ft.com/content/67001056-5b39-11e7-9bc8-8055f264aa8b> both 
accessed 27.9.2019. See also, P Coe, The Defamation Act 2013: we need to talk about corporate reputation 
(2015) Journal of Business Law (4) 313-333, 313 (JBL); P Coe, The Value of Corporate Reputation and the 
Defamation Act 2013: A brave New World or Road to Ruin? (2013) 18 Communications Law (Comms Law) 
112,112. 
5 [2007] 1 AC 359. 
6 Ibid para 158. 
7 This argument, and the fragility of small companies when it comes to reputational damage, is supported by the 
2005 Australian uniform defamation reforms which, as discussed at section III below, removed the right to sue 
for defamation from companies with ten or more employees. The Standing Committee of Attorneys-General 
recognised that small, for-profit bodies, may be disproportionately affected by a defamatory publication and less 
likely to weather its consequences. It therefore recognises the need for smaller entities to be able to protect 
themselves: Defamation Act 2005 (NSW, Qld, Vic, SA, Tas) sec 9; Defamation Act 2006 (NT) sec 9; Civil Law 
(Wrongs) Act 2002 (ACT) sec 121; New South Wales Government, Statutory Review Defamation Act 2005, 




Thus, the performance of economies and the continued social and economic 
development of communities are inextricably linked to corporate success.8 This link is 
underlined further by sec 172(1)(d) of the Companies Act 2006, which requires directors to 
take account of ‘the impact of the company’s operations on the community and the 
environment’. Although, as Carney states, the notion of ‘community’ is, potentially, 
amorphous,9 it can be regarded as including the people, businesses and institutions located in 
the vicinity within which the company is based.10 Indeed, according to Keay, having regard 
for the community:11 
…might manifest itself in a number of ways, such as a donation to a local cause or refraining 
from actions which might deleteriously affect the community…[D]irectors…have to justify any 
such action as enhancing the success of the company. This does not…mean that success has to 
be reduced to monetary terms. Having an input in the community might be seen as contributing 
to the success of the company as a respected local firm, and part of its role as a good citizen. 
This might enhance its reputation, which could arguably contribute to the company’s 
success12…[To the contrary a] company might decline to take on a project that despite being 
potentially profitable could alienate the local or wider community and lead to the entity being 
derided, and see its reputation diminish. 
Despite the importance of reputation to a company and its community, it remains difficult to 
define and has been described in a myriad of ways.13 For example, it is considered to be a 
                                                          
8 J Smythe/C Dorward/ J Reback, Corporate Reputation: Managing the New Strategic Asset (1992), 4. An example 
of such a link is the car manufacturing industry in the Midlands and North East of England. If, for example, Jaguar 
Land Rover (Solihull and Wolverhampton) or Nissan (Sunderland) were to suffer the same sort of damage to their 
reputation in respect of models manufactured at these plants as Toyota did between 2009 to 2010 when it had to 
recall twelve million vehicles worldwide, or Volkswagen did in relation to the emissions scandal, which it is 
estimated has already cost the company $30 billion, it could have a huge impact on sales and production which, 
in turn, could damage the local economies in which they are based. 
9 W Carney, Does Defining Constituencies Matter? (1990) 59 University of Cincinnati Law Review (UCLR) 
385, 414. 
10 A Keay, Directors’ Duties (2nd edn 2014) 155. 
11 Ibid 157. 
12 Ibid 156. 




‘multi-stakeholder concept that is reflected in the perceptions that stakeholders have of an 
organisation.’14 It has also been defined as the ‘perceptual representation of a company’s past 
actions and future prospects that describes the firm’s overall appeal to all of its key 
constituents when compared with other leading rivals.’15 Regardless of the definition 
adopted, clearly reputation is valuable.16 Indeed, in Jameel, significantly, Lord Bingham, 
Lord Hope and Lord Scott all agreed that reputation is a thing of value, 17 and, more 
poignantly, Lord Hoffmann stated that it is an asset as it attracts customers.18 In Dixon v 
Holden it was held that reputation is potentially more valuable than other property.19  
This ‘value’ attached to corporate reputation is illustrated by a number of real-world 
examples. According to the Reputation Institute’s 2019 Global RepTrak 100 Report, Rolex 
and Lego are the world’s top two most reputable companies. 20 The report recognises a clear 
link between reputation and consumer support for a product or service. Thus, for instance, a 
score of 70-79 translates to 60% of consumers willing to buy the product or use the service.21 
Arguably the most explicit and obvious way to evaluate and quantify the value of reputation 
to corporations is through examples of incidents that have damaged reputations, and have, 
consequently, had an impact on financial performance.22 Although an extreme example, the 
2010 Deepwater Horizon oil rig explosion, and subsequent oil spill, is illustrative of this 
                                                          
14 A Smidts/ T Pruyn/ C van Riel, The Impact of Employee Communication and Perceived External Prestige on 
Organisational Identification (2001) 44 Academy of Management Journal (AMJ) 1051; C Hillenbrand/K Money, 
Corporate Responsibility and Corporate Reputation: Two Separate Concepts or Two Sides of the Same Coin? 
(2007) 10 Corporate Reputation Review (CRR) 261, 262; J Larkin, Strategic Reputation Risk Management (2003) 
43. 
15 C Fombrun, Reputation: Realizing Value from the Corporate Image (1996) 72. 
16 It has been described as an asset that requires constant care to ensure that it develops positively from generation 
to generation. See: Smythe (fn 8) 7. 
17 [2007] 1 AC 359, [91].   
18 Ibid. [26] per Lord Bingham; [101] per Lord Hope; [120] per Lord Scott. See also: Derbyshire County Council 
v Times Newspapers Ltd [1993] AC 534, 547. 
19 (1868-69) LRR 7 Eq 488, 492. 
20 https://insights.reputationinstitute.com/reptrak-reports/global-reptrak-2019 49-73 accessed 7.10.2019. 
21 Ibid. 




point.23 BP spent more than $90 million on public relations in the first three months of the 
spill alone to attempt to improve its damaged reputation.24 Incidentally, Transocean, the 
company that owned and operated the Deepwater Horizon rig, experienced a 14% fall in 
share value in the aftermath of the disaster.25 
 
III Suing in defamation: historic roots and modern controversy 
In English law a company’s right to sue in defamation26 can be traced back to the mid-
nineteenth century.27 However, due to the Court of Appeal’s reasoning, the seminal case on 
                                                          
23 For detailed analysis of the claims brought against BP and the company’s compensation scheme, see: C 
McDonnell, The Gulf Coast Claims Facility and the Deepwater Horizon Litigation: Judicial Regulation of 
Private Compensation Schemes (2012) 64 Stanford Law Review (SLR) 765; T Schoenbaum, Liability for 
Damages in Oil Spill Accidents: Evaluating the USA and International Law Regimes in the light of Deepwater 
Horizon (2012) 24 Journal of Environmental Law (JEL),395.  
24 J Vidal, BP’s PR Campaign Fails to Clean up Reputation after Gulf Oil Spill, The Guardian, 14 April 2011, 
available at: <https www.guardian.co.uk/environment/blog/2011/apr/14/bp-pr-campaign-gulf-oil-spill> accessed 
27.9.2019. For the purposes of satisfying the serious harm and serious financial loss tests pursuant to secs 1(1) 
and (2) of the Defamation Act 2013, according to ReachLocal UK Ltd v Bennett [2015] EMLR 7, money spent 
on mitigating reputational damage by, for example, employing PR consultants, is evidence of actual or likely 
serious financial loss.  
25 C Krauss, Oil Spill’s Blow to BP’s Image May Eclipse Costs, The New York Times, 29 April 2010, available 
at:< https://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/30/business/30bp.html> accessed 27.9.2019. Although during the Public 
Bill Committee’s Parliamentary Debate on the Defamation Bill, there was debate over whether a fall in share 
price could demonstrate actual or likely serious harm, with Jonathan Djanogly arguing that it could (a view 
supported by Holroyd Pearce LJ’s judgment in Lewis v Daily Telegraph Limited [1963] 1 QB 340 (CA), 376 
and Rose LJ’s judgment in McCarthy Stone plc v Daily Telegraph (unrep) 11 November 1993), and Paul 
Farrelly arguing that it could not, the decision in Collins Stewart v Financial Times Ltd [2005] EMLR 5 has 
confirmed that it cannot (see also Dillon LJ’s judgment in Lonrho v Fayed (No 5) [1994] 1 All ER 188, 196 (a)-
(g)). Therefore, the accepted position is that a reduction in share price is not sufficient to establish actual or 
likely serious financial loss as it is not an aspect of goodwill or an asset of the company. For Djanogly and 
Farrelly’s opinions see: Paul Farrelly and Jonathan Djanogly (HC), Parliamentary Debate, Public Bill 
Committee, Defamation Bill, Fifth Sitting, 26 June 2012, 205 f. See also the views of Ben Gummer at 196. 
26  It is also possible for a company to use malicious falsehood as a cause of action. However, in order to maintain 
such an action, the claimant must show that: (i) the defendant published to third parties words which are false; (ii) 
that they refer to the claimant, or their property or their business; (iii) that they were published maliciously; and 
(iv) that special damage has followed as a direct and natural result of their publication. Because the requirements 
for establishing a claim for malicious falsehood are significantly more onerous than defamation, it is rarely used. 
Consequently, it is beyond the scope of this article. See generally: A Mullis/R Parkes QC (eds) Gatley on Libel 
and Slander (12 edn 2013) paras 21.1 - 21.3.  
27 See The Metropolitan Saloon Omnibus Company (Limited) v Hawkins (1859) 4 Hurlstone & Norman Exchequer 
Reports (H&N) 87, 90 in which Pollock CB stated: ‘That a corporation at common law can sue in respect of a 




the right is South Hetton Coal Co Ltd v North-Eastern News Association Ltd.28 The Court 
decided that a corporation may sue for a libellous statement that is calculated to injure it in 
respect of its business, and may do so without proof of special damage.29 The Court found 
unanimously in favour of the claimant by rejecting the defendant’s argument that a 
corporation had no personal character and could, as a result, not sue in defamation, with Lord 
Esher MR determining that the law of libel is one and the same for all claimants.30 Despite 
Lord Reid in Rubber Improvement v Daily Telegraph31 stating that a company cannot be 
injured in its feelings, only in its pocket,32 the South Hetton principle was reaffirmed by the 
House of Lords in Derbyshire County Council v Times Newspapers Ltd.33 According to Lord 
Keith it is ‘clearly establish[ed] that a trading corporation is entitled to sue in respect of 
defamatory matters which can be seen as having a tendency to damage it in the way of its 
business.’34 
Despite the historic roots of a company’s right to sue in defamation, during the 
debates leading to the introduction of the Defamation Act 2013, the fact that corporations 
were able to do so to protect their reputations was a controversial issue. Indeed, according to 
Mullis and Scott ‘preventing corporates from suing [was] a primary goal of some libel 
reformers’.35 This is reflected by a Ministry of Justice consultation on the Bill, in which there 
was significant support for the idea that English defamation law should follow the 2005 
Australian uniform defamation reforms36 which, pursuant to sec 9 of the Defamation Act 
                                                          
28 [1894] 1 Queen’s Bench (QB) 133. 
29 Ibid. 141 (Lopez LJ), 148 (Kay LJ). 
30 Ibid. 138. 
31 [1964] AC 234. 
32 Ibid. 262. 
33 [1992] QB 770. 
34 Ibid. 546. 
35 A Mullis/A Scott, The Swing of the Pendulum: Reputation, Expression and the Re-Centring of English Libel 
Law (2012) 63 Northern Ireland Legal Quarterly (NILQ) 27, 54. 





2005, had removed the right to sue for defamation from companies with ten or more 
employees.37 However, due to the UK being a signatory to the ECHR, the options for reform 
available to Parliament were limited as compared to those available to Australian 
legislators.38 Indeed, the Joint Committee on the Draft Defamation Bill heard evidence that 
removing the right to sue in defamation from companies might be incompatible with the 
ECHR.39 Consequently, rather than following the Australian example, the day before the 
2013 Act received Royal Assent, Parliament introduced a qualification for the sec 1(1) 
serious harm requirement for bodies trading-for-profit; to meet the serious harm threshold, 
under sec 1(2), they need to demonstrate actual or likely serious financial loss. Although 
included late, this qualification was enshrined within the Act.  
However, subsequent to the introduction of the 2013 Act in the UK, the New South 
Wales (NSW) government has undertaken a statutory review of the Defamation Act 200540 
that has clearly recognised the importance of corporate reputation and has left open the 
possibility of reform in that area. Although the Review held that the balance struck by sec 9 
continues to be appropriate, it was persuaded to recommend a further discrete review of the 
provision to determine whether or not it should be amended.41 Its decision was based on two 
factors: firstly, the fact that Australia’s approach does not correspond with the approaches in 
                                                          
37 Defamation Act 2005 (NSW, Qld, Vic, SA, Tas) sec 9; Defamation Act 2006 (NT) sec 9; Civil Law (Wrongs) 
Act 2002 (ACT) sec 121. For analysis of the impact of these reforms on corporations see generally: M Collins, 
Protecting Corporate Reputations in the Era of Uniform National Defamation Laws (2008) 13 Media & Arts 
Law Review (MALR) 447. 
38 Acheson (2018) 10 JML 49, 49 f. 
39 Joint Committee on the Draft Defamation Bill, Oral and Associated Written Evidence Volume II (2010-12, 
HL 203, HC 930-II) 18-19 (Lord Lester), 381-386 (Lord McNally).  
40 New South Wales Government, Statutory Review Defamation Act 2005, June 2018. 




other similar jurisdictions,42 including the United States,43 Canada,44 New Zealand45 and the 
UK; secondly, the submission from the NSW Bar Association, which clearly reflects the 
arguments advanced throughout this article, that sec 9 should be expanded to permit all 
corporations to sue for defamation, on the basis that the reputations of businesses are also 
critically important, and are a legitimate interest, that needs to be protected.46  
Since the coming into force of the 2013 Act the ECtHR has left open the possibility 
that corporations could claim an ECHR right to reputation under the A1P1 right to property. 
As stated in section I, in his article Acheson argues that corporations should not have a right 
to reputation under A1P1, but rather should have such a right under art 8 ECHR.47 Arguably, 
this controversy is fuelled by the problematic precondition that defamation actions by 
corporations are dependent upon those companies having a reputation that can be damaged 
as, Oster states, reputation is, ‘at first glance’, a characteristic attributed to individuals.48 
However, as established in section II, companies can also have a reputation. As argued in 
section II, and as recognised by the NSW Government’s Review of the Australian 
Defamation Act 2005, in many situations a company’s reputation is vital, not only for its 
prosperity, but also its very existence The ‘health’ of a company’s reputation can directly 
affect the overall state of the business which, in turn, can have a significant impact on the 
local community in which it is based. Therefore, it has the potential to indirectly affect many 
                                                          
42 Ibid. Para 2.7. 
43 Ibid. The Review recognises that ‘in most states of the United States, a corporation can sue in defamation where 
an untrue “actionable statement” has been made in writing or verbally to a third person, and has caused the 
corporation damage.’  
44 Canada allows corporations to sue in defamation in the same way as natural persons, although some Canadian 
academics have suggested that Canada follow the Australian approach, citing corporations’ disproportionate 
resource and influence as compared to individuals having a potentially chilling effect on free speech.  
45 Section 6 of the Defamation Act 1992 allows a body corporate to bring a claim for defamation where the 
defamatory publication has, or is likely to, cause the body corporate a pecuniary loss. 
46 New South Wales Government, Statutory Review Defamation Act 2005, June 2018, para 2.4. 
47 Acheson (2018) 10 JML 49. 
48 J Oster, The Criticism of Trading Corporations and their Right to Sue for Defamation (2011) 2 Journal of 




individuals. As a result, it is arguable that the reputation of businesses is at least as important 
as the reputation of individuals.  Thus, this article disagrees with Acheson’s view, and instead 
argues that the right to reputation should be subsumed within the concept of reputation as 
property and should, therefore, enable corporations to avail themselves of a positive right to 
the protection of reputation, as property, under A1P1.  
 
IV The notion of reputation as property? 
In determining the issue of whether corporate reputation can amount to ‘property’, the 
inevitable question begged is what in fact is ‘property’; what are its defining characteristics 
and features as a legal institution? This question is not easy to answer and is one that has 
challenged legal scholars for many years. Indeed, various theories have emerged over time to 
try to explain the nature of property as an institution. Perhaps, however, a simple starting 
point is to remind ourselves of the traditional categorisation of property in English law, 
namely, that property falls into the camps of either Real Property, Chattels-Real (leases) and 
Personalty (this category being further sub-divided into Choses in Possession (such as money 
and chattels) and Choses in Action (such as Copyright, Patents and shares etcetera). 
In his ‘The Second Treatise of Government’ it was John Locke who proposed a theory 
of private property rights. Locke rooted this in the law of nature, which, he claimed, 
permitted individuals to appropriate and exercise control rights over things in the world like 
land and other material resources.49 Thus, it was Locke who provides us with one of the 
original justificatory accounts about the legitimacy of private property rights. Yet, it was the 
philosopher Jeremey Bentham who had to remind lawyers that property is not a thing but 
                                                          




rather a relationship, property being the condition of being ‘proper’ that is ‘belonging’ to a 
particular person. As a result, it is the relationship between the thing (‘object’) and the person 
(‘subject’) which provides us with the key to understanding the concept of property.50 Yet it 
is rather simplistic to think just in terms of there being an owner of property in terms of a 
thing, for the reality is more complex, due to the fact that it is often possible for conflicting 
claims to be brought by two or more ‘subjects’ in respect of the same ‘object’, and legal 
systems frequently have to deal with the merits of relative claims. Thus, land, for example, as 
an object of property, may generate a variety of respective claims simultaneously made by, 
for example, an owner-occupier, leaseholder, mortgagee or neighbour. Consequently, at its 
heart, in terms of orthodox property law theory, property law systems often have to resolve 
the different claims brought by the subjects of property as against the object of property.51 
A powerful and salient feature of the property concept is the fact that it represents a 
dynamic relationship between subject and object, heavily influenced by social, political and 
economic factors at any given time. The ‘subjects’ of property can change. For example, for 
many years, married women could not own property in their own right with all their property 
vesting in their husbands upon marriage.52 Similarly, and more importantly for the purposes 
of this paper, it is significant that the ‘objects’ of property are susceptible to change, that is, 
the ‘resources’ capable of lying at the heart of the institution of property. A clear single 
example here can be gleaned from the fact that a few hundred years ago slaves were regarded 
as the ‘objects’ of property, an idea which nowadays would seem ridiculous as well as 
outrageous. The point here being that the objects of property clearly change with the political 
                                                          
50 J Bentham, An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation (1789, 1948) 337 note 1 (chap XVI, 
sec 26). 
51 See generally: CR Noyes, The Institution of Property (1936) 357 and KJ Gray/ PD Symes, Real Property and 
Real People (1981) ch 1. 
52 This position was changed to favour married women by virtue of the introduction of the Married Women’s 




and socio-economic development of society. It is this dynamic quality of the institution of 
property, in particular its changing objects, which plays a vital role in our understanding of 
the institution of property. The objects of property are therefore clearly susceptible to change 
as a result of the socio-economic and political forces which are at work in society at any 
given time. Indeed, in the words of Clarke and Kohler:53 
…property is no more than a normative set of relationships which might be attached to 
whatever subject-matter society deems it necessary or beneficial to make the subject of 
property… 
In this connection it can be noted that there is often a pressure in society to recognise 
new property rights. So, for example, in his article ‘The New Property’, Reich argued that 
new forms of wealth (such as welfare benefits), which have arisen in the wake of the 
increased role of government, demand the same legal protection as that accorded to private 
property.54 Reich argued this so as to entrench welfare payments in order to bring them 
within the constitutional safeguard of preventing ‘deprivation of property without due process 
of law’, whilst using the rhetorical power of private property. However, despite this effort, as 
Clarke and Kohler point out, ultimately the term ‘property’ is simply a means of signposting 
what is and what is not regarded as a resource.55 This is necessarily a political and socio-
economic question and one which helps dictate the changing nature of the objects of 
property. Whether or not one agrees with it as a philosophy, the reality is, nowadays, we live 
in a world where neo-liberal economics has become the orthodoxy bringing with it its new 
vision of property – a vision that implies the private appropriation of virtually all value.56 
Therefore, against this important backdrop it surely then becomes arguable that the ‘objects’ 
                                                          
53A Clarke/P Kohler, Property Law Commentary and Materials, Law in Context Series (2005), 372. The word 
‘subject’ is what we have termed object in this part of this paper. 
54 R Reich, The New Property (1964) 5 Yale Law Journal (YLR) 733. 
55 Ibid at 374. 




of property can be seen as capable of changing so as to incorporate the concept of corporate 
reputation – clearly a thing of value in the market place. 
It can be pointed out that trademarks are signs of authorship of certain products which 
carry with them the reputation of the author. This reputation, like corporate goodwill, is a 
thing which is earned in the market place and generates value in the form of the trader’s 
goodwill.57 It was, however, in Victorian times that actions relating to trademark violation 
came to be seen as primarily actions founded in the protection of a property interest rather 
than an action based on the prevention of fraud.58  However, as has been noted, the adoption 
of the language of property as regards trademarks in the Victorian period and early 20th 
century case law may have had little impact because it was recognised that the ‘property’ 
label was just that, a label. A label used to solve a particular problem, namely, that of 
explaining Equity’s extended jurisdiction beyond that of the Common Law and the 
availability of injunctive relief. Adoption of that label did not in itself mean that trademarks 
were property like land or goods or even like copyright or patents. In this vein in Leather 
Cloth Co v American Leather Cloth59 Lord Cranworth indicated that the term property was 
used in the context of trademarks in ‘a sense very different from what is meant by it when 
applied to a house or watch’. This seems to suggest that it is arguable that trademarks are at 
worst a form of quasi-property, as can be argued is confidential information.60 If this is right 
why should corporate reputation not similarly, at the very least, qualify as quasi-property in 
this sense? Corporate reputation is something that is earned in the marketplace; it might go up 
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or down depending on circumstances.61 It is something which is exclusive to a business and 
which is capable of assignment to any purchaser of the business. It can also be brought to an 
end upon the dissolution of a company. Unlike the freehold title to a house or a watch it lacks 
certainty but at the same time it does have value as it is something earned in the marketplace, 
through labour and endeavour, rather like the goodwill represented in a trademark. It is an 
asset to a business and it is submitted has enough proprietary quality to it to at least be treated 
as a form of quasi-property. If Robert Reich felt able to use the rhetoric of property to argue 
welfare payments were a form of property for the purposes of safeguarding the same within 
the US Constitution, why can we not similarly use the rhetoric of property to argue for the 
protection of corporate reputation for the purposes of the European Convention on Human 
Rights Article 1 First Protocol? 
However, against the backdrop of the modern world of neo-liberal economics, and its 
implied conception of property, namely, the private appropriation of all value, it may, in fact, 
be more appropriate to take the altogether bigger, and perhaps logical step, of treating 
corporate reputation as ‘property’ in the fullest sense. It is submitted that this is the approach 
of Robert Post. Arguably his ‘social foundations’ of reputation, 62 which have filtered into the 
law of defamation, 63 serve to support this notion of reputation as property (as opposed to 
reputation being categorised as quasi-property). Post’s foundations include dignity, honour 
and property. Reputation as dignity is not applicable to corporations.64 As Lord Hoffmann 
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said in Jameel, a corporation has no soul65 and, therefore, cannot feel any loss of dignity.66 
Thus, this concept only applies to the reputation of a natural person. However, Post’s 
concepts of reputation as honour and reputation as property are potentially applicable to 
corporate defamation. In respect of the former, this has already been the subject of 
considerable academic attention, and, as a result, is beyond the scope of this article.67 Rather, 
because of the lack of clarity emanating from recent case law,68 this article is concerned with 
the latter’s ability to provide a conceptual basis for corporations to sue in defamation.  
According to Post, there are: ‘…aspects of modern defamation law that can be 
understood only by reference to the concept of reputation as property, as, for example, the 
fact that corporations and other inanimate entities can sue for defamation.’69 Post’s thesis that 
reputation as property provides a conceptual foundation for companies to sue in defamation 
corresponds with Oster’s view, who has argued that ‘it is a distinctive feature of a company’s 
suit for defamation that it may exclusively70 be explained by the conception of reputation as 
property.’71 Indeed, in The Metropolitan Saloon Omnibus Company (Limited) v Hawkins72 
Pollock CB stated that: ‘it would be very odd if a corporation had no means of protecting 
itself against wrong; and, if its property is injured by slander, it has no means of redress 
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except by action.’73 Thus, the value of reputation is determined by the market in the same 
way as any property loss is measured.74 As Milo suggests, the notion of reputation as 
property reflects the image of the market society; individuals, he argues, are connected 
through the institution of the market.75 Accordingly, Post advances the argument that the 
concept of reputation as property is reputation in the marketplace; a notion of reputation that: 
‘can be understood as a form of intangible property akin to goodwill…acquired as result of 
an individual’s efforts and labour.’76 Hence, if reputation is injured, the resulting loss is 
financially quantifiable.77 
In conclusion, it is submitted that Post’s notion of reputation as property provides 
strong conceptual foundations for reputation to be protected as an aspect of property in the 
fullest sense. At the very least, corporate reputation, as a market generated ‘asset’, has 
enough modern-day ‘proprietary characteristics’ to qualify as a form of quasi-property. 
However, as will be discussed in section VI, despite these contentions, that reputation as 
property provides a legitimate conceptual foundation for corporations to sue in defamation, 
the existence of a positive right to reputation as property for bodies that trade for profit 
pursuant to A1P1 is, by virtue of equivocal jurisprudence from the ECtHR, unclear. In turn, 
this has led to confusion in English law. Before considering the Strasbourg Court’s case law, 
and the effect this has had on English jurisprudence, the following section will look at how 
companies have sought to protect their reputations via the application of art 10 ECHR, and 
why this is not ideal. 
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V Article 10 ECHR 
Article 10(1) provides for the right to freedom of expression. Article 10(2) qualifies this right 
by providing that its application can be restricted for, inter alia, ‘the protection of the 
reputation…of others.’ As this is the only explicit mention of reputation in the ECHR, 
historically, the Strasbourg Court has treated reputation as relevant to it only in the context of 
the application of art 10(2).78   
 It is clear from the jurisprudence of the ECtHR that, in addition to individual 
reputation, the protection of corporate reputation is a justifiable reason to restrict free speech 
pursuant to art 10(2). In other words, art 10(2) allows Member States to restrict freedom of 
expression to protect corporate reputation. This is illustrated by Steel and Morris v United 
Kingdom79 in which the Strasbourg Court held that ‘the English law of defamation, and its 
application in this particular case, pursued the legitimate aim of “the protection of the 
reputation or rights of others.”’80 However, as explained in the following sections, 
legitimately restricting the right to freedom of expression in order to protect a countervailing 
interest, such as reputation, does not provide the same level of protection as guaranteeing that 
interest substantive positive ECHR protection in its own right,81 as would be the case 
pursuant to an A1P1 right to reputation as property. 
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 In his article, Acheson, very usefully, sets out three reasons why this distinction 
between corporate reputation being protected by a positive Convention right, as opposed to 
being merely a permissible justification for restricting free speech, is important.82 Those 
reasons are: (i) this ‘status’ will affect the level of protection afforded to corporate reputation 
in English defamation law; (ii) if companies were subject to a positive ECHR right to 
reputation, then Member States would be obliged to protect that right; and (iii) if a 
Convention right to corporate reputation existed then companies could apply to the ECtHR 
alleging a violation of that right by a Member State. By drawing on Acheson’s article, the 
remainder of this section will consider their implications. 
 
A Impact on English defamation law 
Corporate claimants’ reputation would be subject to a greater level of protection in English 
defamation proceedings if that interest were to fall within the ambit of a positive ECHR right 
than if it did not. Indeed, although relating to the link between art 8 and individual reputation, 
this hierarchy of protection was explicitly recognised by the ECtHR in Lindon v France:83 
Accepting that respect for reputation is an autonomous human right, which 
derives its source from the Convention itself, leads inevitably to a more effective 
protection of the reputation of individuals vis-á-vis freedom of expression. 
Thus, if a positive Convention right to corporate reputation exists then it would also be 
subject to this ‘more effective protection’ from the ECtHR, and in English defamation law. 
Applying this to the existence of an A1P1 right to reputation as property, the permissibility of 
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an interference with the Article would depend on its proportionality,84 which, according to 
the ECtHR in Appleby v UK,85 involves ‘balancing the rights in issue’86 when the right to 
property conflicts with the art 10(1) right to free speech. Although protection for property 
rights is, arguably, less extensive than for other fundamental rights,87 and restrictions on 
A1P1 rights ‘attract a particularly wide margin of appreciation,’88 it is likely that corporate 
reputation would be subject to greater protection if it falls within the scope of A1P1 than if it 
is not subject to positive protection by a Convention right.89 
Conversely, if corporate reputation is not subject to a positive Convention right then 
the reputational interests in a company’s defamation claim are relevant only as a justification 
for restricting the defendant’s expression under art 10(2), as opposed to positively protecting 
the claimant’s reputation.90 As demonstrated by the jurisprudence of the Strasbourg Court, 
Member States must meet a high threshold in order to comply with art 10(2) and, 
consequently, for a company’s reputation to be protected via a legitimate and justifiable 
restriction of the defendant’s art 10(1) free speech right. According to the ECtHR’s judgment 
in Sunday Times v UK (No 2), pursuant to art 10(2), any restriction of freedom of expression 
must be ‘necessary in a democratic society’ in that it deals with a ‘pressing social need’ and 
is ‘proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued.’91 The Court went on to say that if the 
restriction of the art 10(1) right is challenged in Strasbourg then its necessity ‘must be 
convincingly established’ by the Member State.92 Furthermore, corporate defamation claims 
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often involve matters of public interest.93 The Court’s jurisprudence is clear that where the 
public interest is at stake this threshold is raised to an even higher level. It has stated that any 
potential protection afforded to companies’ reputational interests via an art 10(2) restriction 
on free speech is subject to the ‘most careful scrutiny’ and in Heinisch v Germany94 it held 
that art 10(2) provides ‘little scope…for restrictions on debate on questions of public 
interest.’95 Accordingly, Oster, Acheson and Mullis and Scott have all observed that if the 
protection of reputation is treated solely as a justification for restricting the defendant’s art 
10(1) right to freedom of expression, then the Strasbourg Court’s human rights analysis will 
start from the presumption that their free speech rights take priority over the countervailing 
reputational interests of the claimant company.96 
 
B Obligation on member states to protect corporate reputation 
If a positive ECHR right to corporate reputation existed, then, crucially, it would give rise to 
duties and obligations that would be imposed on Member States in respect of its protection. 
Conversely, without such a right, the protection of corporate reputation within UK law is 
merely permissible, rather than being required.97 
 This distinction is illustrated by evidence given by Lord McNally to the Joint 
Committee on the Draft Defamation Bill98 on the interpretation of the ECtHR’s judgment in 
Steel and Morris v United Kingdom99 in which the Court held that a Member State ‘enjoys a 
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margin of appreciation as to the means it provides under domestic law to enable a company  
to challenge the truth, and limit the damage, of allegations which risk harming its 
reputation.’100 The Court went on to determine that: ‘[i]f…a State decides to provide such a 
remedy to a corporate body’ then defendants’ art 10 rights require ‘a measure of procedural 
fairness’ in the operation of that remedy.101 According to Lord McNally this could be 
interpreted as ruling that the Member State’s margin of appreciation ‘extends as far as 
deciding to offer no remedy.’102 As Acheson states, this interpretation must be correct as art 1 
ECHR places a requirement on Member States to ‘secure to everyone within their jurisdiction 
the rights and freedoms defined in…this Convention,’ whereas there is no obligation to 
protect interests not falling within the scope of a Convention right. 
 Thus, if corporate reputation falls within the scope of a Convention right, then it will 
give rise to obligations under art 1.103 As explained above, these can include: (i) negative 
obligations, which prohibit Member States from action which would violate ECHR rights; 
and (ii) positive obligations, in that Members States must ensure the protection of the right in 
the context of private law, such as defamation claims.104 Consequently, as discussed further 
in section VII, if the UK is under a positive obligation to protect corporate reputation, 
removing the right of companies to sue in defamation, as happened, to an extent, in Australia, 
is likely to be incompatible with the ECHR, and hence would be prevented.  
 
C. The right of companies to apply to the European Court of Human Rights 
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According to Emberland, for the purposes of art 34 ECHR, corporations, including for-profit 
companies, are classed as ‘non-governmental organisations’, meaning they have locus standi 
to apply to the ECtHR where it is claimed that their rights have been violated.105 
Consequently, if a positive ECHR right to corporate reputation existed then it would provide 
a mechanism for companies to apply to the Strasbourg Court when a violation of that right is 
alleged.106 
VI  ‘Goodwill’ and the scope of Article 1 Protocol 1 of the ECHR 
Pursuant to the previous section, it is clear that the existence or otherwise of a positive ECHR 
right to corporate reputation has important repercussions for the ongoing application, and any 
future reform, of English defamation law.107 However, as will be discussed in this section, 
whether or not such a right exists within the scope of A1P1 is unclear which, in turn, has 
serious implications for claimants trading for profit within an English law context. 
As a general rule, the ECtHR has ‘never doubted’ that corporations can be 
beneficiaries of ECHR rights,108 as, by definition, companies are ‘rights bearing legal 
entities’109 which, without enforceable rights, would be unable to pursue and fulfil the 
object(s) of their existence.110 As Acheson states: ‘The existence of corporate rights under a 
supranational treaty such as the ECHR has the benefits of promoting some uniformity across 
jurisdictions, and of protecting those rights against the arbitrary use of state power.’111 Case 
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law such as Sunday Times v UK (No 2),112 Autronic AG v Switzerland113 and Bladet Tromsø v 
Norway114 demonstrates that some of the ECtHR’s most important and influential free speech 
jurisprudence  emanates from claims brought by corporations.  
However, the Strasbourg Court’s position relating to corporations’ right to reputation 
as property under A1P1 is far from clear. Underlying this lack of clarity in the Court’s 
thinking is the conflict between two principles found in its jurisprudence.115 On the one hand, 
A1P1 applies only to existing possessions and, therefore, does not guarantee the right to 
acquire possessions. On the other hand, it has been established that actions that diminish the 
present value of a professional’s ‘clientele’ or a corporation’s ‘goodwill’ may amount to an 
interference with a possession, and therefore the right to reputation as property, for the 
purposes of A1P1.116 For a number of years the former principle did not, to any great extent, 
constrain the application of the latter.117 However, as will be seen in the following section, 
the Strasbourg Court, and to a lesser extent, the ECHR, has not only left open the 
applicability of A1P1 to corporate reputation, but has created two conflicting lines of case 
law. The first recognises that the ‘goodwill’ of a business is a possession under A1P1, 
therefore attracting the protection the article. To the contrary, the second line of jurisprudence 
establishes that reductions in goodwill due to reductions in expected future income are 
effectively claims for loss of future income, which does not attract the protection of A1P1. 
A A1P1 and the equivocal position of the European Court of Human Rights 
A1P1 provides that: 
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‘Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his 
possessions. No one shall be deprived of his possessions except in the public 
interest and subject to the conditions provided for by law and by the general 
principles of international law.’ 
B Goodwill as a possession under A1P1 
The goodwill of a business as a possession has historic roots. For example, in Trego v Hunt118 
Lord Macnaghten stated that goodwill ‘is the whole advantage, whatever it may be, of the 
reputation and connection of the firm.’119 From a Strasbourg perspective it can be traced back 
to König v Germany120 from which Judge Wiarda’s opinion that ‘[t]he clinic, the practice and 
the patients represented an element of “goodwill” which likewise was in the nature of a 
private right similar, in some respects, to the right of property’ was relied upon by the 
applicants in Van Marle v Netherlands121 which represented the first case on the protection of 
goodwill under A1P1. The applicants complained of a state action that they alleged had 
caused a decrease in ‘the value of the goodwill of their accountancy practices.’122 The ECtHR 
held that: 
…by dint of their own work, the applicants had built up a clientele; this had in many 
respects the nature of a private right and constituted an asset and, hence, a possession 
within the meaning of the first sentence of [A1P1]… 
The refusal to register the applicants…radically affected the conditions of their 
professional activities and the scope of those activities was reduced. Their income fell, as 
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did the value of their clientele and, more generally, their business. Consequently, there 
was an interference with their right to peaceful enjoyment of their possessions.123 
The Strasbourg Court’s approach in Van Marle was subsequently adopted in a number of 
cases,124 giving rise to a consistent line of case law that determines that the goodwill of a 
professional practice,125 or of a ‘business engaged in commerce’,126 can be a possession. 
Moreover, in Mowbray’s view, the case of Tre Traktörer Aktiebolag v Sweden127 indicates 
that A1P1 can protect ‘non-material commercial interests such as the goodwill (that is, the 
financial value of a company’s reputation) of established businesses.’128 Consequently, as 
Oster states, the interest in corporate reputation ‘neatly fits’ with this jurisprudence and 
should, therefore, be protected under A1P1.129 However, despite this, as set out in the 
following section, a diverging, and conflicting line of case law has emerged which casts 
doubt on whether A1P1 offers positive protection for corporation reputation. 
 
C Conflicting lines of case law from the European Commission on Human Rights 
and the European Court of Human Rights 
Despite the ECtHR’s jurisprudence clearly identifying goodwill as a possession under A1P1 a 
separate line of case law has established the principle that a loss of future income will not 
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engage the article, as it does not protect the right to acquire property. For instance, in Marckx 
v Belgium130 the Court held that A1P1 ‘does no more than enshrine the right of everyone to 
the peaceful enjoyment of “his” possessions…consequently it applies only to a person’s 
existing possession and…it does not guarantee the right to acquire possession...’131 Similarly, 
in JA Pye (Oxford) Ltd v UK132 the Strasbourg Court found that A1P1 ‘does not…guarantee 
the right to acquire property.’133 
To confuse matters further, shortly after Marckx, the Commission handed down its 
judgment in X v Germany,134 which, in a number of cases, was subsequently cited as 
authority for the proposition that ‘future income could only be considered to constitute a 
“possession”, if it had already been earned or where an unenforceable claim existed to it.’135 
However, although an identical formulation of the X proposition appeared in Pinnacle Meat 
Processors v United Kingdom,136 the Commission did not acknowledge any inconsistency 
between the proposition and the fact that the ‘applicants’ valuation of their businesses include 
substantial elements represented by future income.’137 As acknowledged by Bhasin, the 
judgments in the Van Marle line of case law discussed in the previous section did not refer to 
the X proposition at all, despite them being handed down after X was decided.138 This 
inconsistency and lack of clarity, even within the Commission’s own jurisprudence, is further 
demonstrated by the fact that the Admissibility Decision in Karni v Sweden139 – which is one 
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of the cases from the Van Marle line – shows that the X proposition was referred to in the 
Swedish Government’s submissions, but was not taken any further by the Commission itself. 
Unfortunately, the confusion does not stop with the Commission, or the ECtHR’s 
decisions in Marckx and JA Pye. Strasbourg jurisprudence has created a further divergence. 
In Edgar v United Kingdom140 the Court held the applicant’s claim to property in goodwill 
‘based upon the profits generated by the business’ is, essentially, a complaint ‘in substance of 
loss of future income’ which ‘falls outside the scope of [A1P1].’141 Almost identical 
reasoning was subsequently applied by the ECtHR in a number of subsequent cases,142 which 
made its decision in Wendenburg v Germany143 all the more surprising. In this case the Court 
considered a complaint that the removal of the applicant’s rights of audience in the appeal 
courts, and the alleged subsequent loss of clientele this caused, breached A1P1. In coming to 
its decision, the Court found that, to the extent the complaint concerned a loss of future 
income, it fell outside the scope of A1P1, a decision that clearly corresponds with the case 
law discussed above. However, in what seems like direct conflict with its previous 
jurisprudence, it went on to say that A1P1 ‘extends to law practices and their clientele, as 
these are entities of a certain worth that have in many respects the nature of a private right 
and thus constitute assets and therefore possessions within the meaning of [A1P1].’ 
Undoubtedly, this is a confusing and equivocal position to adopt144 as a legal practice, which 
it seems, in this context at least, means its brand and reputation, and its client base, do not 
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have inherent worth distinct from the present value of the future income that they are 
expected to generate for the practice. Rather, they form part of the intangible pool of 
goodwill which is inextricably linked to the future economic benefits in the practice.145 
D What this means for English law 
The equivocality of the Strasbourg jurisprudence has filtered down into English case law. In 
R (Nicholds) v Security Industry Association146 Kenneth Parker QC considered that a business 
had a capital value or goodwill only if it was capable of being organised in a way that 
allowed future cash flows to be capitalised.147 In other words, goodwill would only constitute 
a possession if it is capable of being sold. This analysis has been the subject of subsequent 
approval, as demonstrated by Auld LJ’s judgment in R (Malik) v Waltham Forest NHS 
Primary Care Trust148 in which he described it as ‘powerful.’149  
 Malik concerned the unlawful suspension of Dr Malik from his Primary Care Trust’s 
‘performers list’, which resulted in him being unable to practise within the National Health 
Service. Consequently, it was alleged that his practice suffered a loss of goodwill, including 
reputation, as a result. Dr Malik was unable to sell the goodwill in his practice by virtue of 
statutory prohibition.150 Although, the issue did not arise in this case as Dr Malik’s practice 
had no economic value due to the statutory prohibition on selling its goodwill,151 Auld LJ 
endorsed the marketability analysis for determining whether goodwill constitutes a 
possession under A1P1.152 According to Acheson, under this approach, corporate reputation 
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should not be considered a possession as, according to Moses LJ, the reputation element of 
goodwill, although potentially valuable, is not marketable.153  
On this interpretation, a company cannot sell its reputation, because the reputation is 
inseparable from the company itself.154 However, it is submitted that this analysis is flawed 
for two primary reasons. Firstly, it does not take into account companies that exist simply to 
licence their reputation. For example, car manufacturers tend to operate their dealerships on a 
franchise basis. The franchisee will ‘purchase’ the reputation of the car manufacturer in the 
form of a licence, yet the dealership will still operate under its own name. Indeed, many 
dealerships operate multiple franchises with different manufacturers. In this way, the 
reputation of the manufacturer and dealership are distinct. Secondly, as acknowledged by Rix 
LJ, it is difficult to reconcile with the jurisprudence of the ECtHR. According to Rix LJ, 
distinguishing goodwill from future earnings prospects ‘may turn out to be difficult, possibly 
even unworkable, given that the present-day value of any business will inevitably reflect its 
future profit-earning capacity.’155 He doubted whether a ‘marketability’ test was the answer, 
given the ‘substantive distinction’ between goodwill and future income drawn by the ECtHR, 
and because the Strasbourg Court had repeatedly found goodwill in the form of a 
professional’s clientele, which was not readily marketable, to be a ‘possession.’156  
E Sitting on the fence and the mirror principle 
The Strasbourg Court has had opportunities to bring clarity to this situation but, 
unfortunately, has so far failed to do so, and is seemingly intent to sit on the fence. For 
example, in Malik v United Kingdom157 although the Court affirmed the Court of Appeal’s 
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decision that a right to practise a profession was not a possession under A1P1, it failed to 
address the issue of when goodwill could be. Rather, in determining that Dr Malik had 
goodwill in the form of his ‘vested interest and his patient list’, even though he was prevented 
from selling it, it seemed to suggest that ‘marketability’ was not a requirement.158 Regardless 
of this, the Court confusingly held that ‘the question whether there is a possession in the 
present case is inextricably linked to the question whether there has been an interference.’ 
Consequently, it avoided deciding whether the applicant’s business interests were 
“possessions” under A1P1 by determining that, even if they were, there had been no 
interference with them.159 There was an equally equivocal outcome in Firma EDV Für Sie 
EfS Elektronische Datenverarbeitung Dienstleistungs GmBH v Germany160 in which the 
applicant, who was a ‘legal person founded exclusively for business purposes’,161 argued that 
its art 8 and A1P1 rights had been infringed by the failure of the German courts to protect it 
from statements made by another private party that had ‘tarnished [its] reputation and ruined 
its economic foundation.’162 The Strasbourg Court decided, inter alia, to leave open the 
question of whether a company’s reputation and goodwill constitute ‘possessions’ under 
A1P1, thereby attracting the protection of that article.163  
 Undoubtedly, the law in this area is a mess. It is subject to conflicting lines of case 
law and equivocal jurisprudence within those lines which, as stated by Bhasin, produce 
arbitrary and unclear outcomes. 164 It seems that the preferred approach in England is that 
only an interference with ‘capitalised’ or ‘marketable’ goodwill engages the article, although, 
as argued above, this interpretation is flawed and is subject to opposing views. To the 
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contrary, Strasbourg case law requires that ‘goodwill’ is separated from ‘future income’, 
albeit it does not provide any rational basis for doing so. 
From an English law perspective, the House of Lords consistently interpreted the 
obligation imposed on judges to take Strasbourg jurisprudence into account in domestic 
proceedings, pursuant to sec 2 of the Human Rights Act 1998, strictly, meaning that English 
jurisprudence should ‘mirror’ the jurisprudence of the ECtHR.165 According to Lord Bingham 
in R (on the application of Ullah) v Special Adjudicator166 failure to follow ‘clear and 
constant’ Strasbourg jurisprudence would be unlawful under sec 6(1) HRA 1998,167 unless 
there are ‘special circumstances’168 that justify departure from that approach.169  Despite Lord 
Bingham’s judgment in Ullah being the subject of both judicial170 and academic171 criticism, 
the mirror principle remains in place, which means that unless it can be persuasively argued 
that such ‘special circumstances’ exist, then the analysis of the European Court should be 
followed. Consequently, it is unfortunate that the ECtHR did not take the opportunity to 
provide a clear and unequivocal determination to this issue in either Malik or Firma. Had it 
have done so, pursuant to the mirror principle, it would have provided much needed clarity 
by way of a clear rationale that must, in principle at least, be followed. 
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VI Conclusion: a flawed approach and a way forward 
Despite the equivocal jurisprudence set out above, it is submitted that a company’s reputation 
should, in fact, fall within the ambit of the right to protection of property pursuant to A1P1 of 
the ECHR. This conclusion is drawn from the following factors. Firstly, as argued throughout 
this article, the ability of businesses to be able to protect their reputation is not only vital for 
their health and prosperity, but also that of the communities within which they are located. 
The critical importance of corporate reputation within this context has recently been 
acknowledged by the NSW Government’s Review of the Australian Defamation Act 2005 
and is reflected by the approaches to corporate reputation adopted by a number of 
jurisdictions.172  Secondly, A1P1 explicitly applies to ‘legal persons.’ Thirdly, as discussed in 
section IV, a company’s reputation is based on the concept of reputation as property. As 
advocated in that section, in line with Post’s social foundations of reputation, there is a strong 
conceptual basis for reputation to be considered property in the fullest sense. Failing that, at 
the very least, it supports the argument that corporate reputation qualifies as a form of quasi-
property. Fourthly, although admittedly a weaker argument in light of the conflicting case 
law considered in section VI, there is a clear line of Strasbourg jurisprudence, pursuant to 
Van Marle, that recognises that A1P1 protects the right to conduct a business and the 
commercial goodwill and clientele built up by the company’s work. As Oster states, ‘[b]y 
virtue of its commercial nature, a trading company’s reputation, that is, its deserved ‘good 
name’, neatly fits in this context.’173  
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 As argued in section V, recognising that corporate reputation is protected by A1P1 
has significant repercussions. Although the qualifications to art 10(1) ECHR pursuant to art 
10(2) allow the respective State to justifiably interfere with the right to freedom of expression 
‘for the protection of the reputation or rights of others,’ the State is burdened with justifying 
any such interference based on tests of necessity and proportionality. Thus, as acknowledged 
by Fenwick and Phillipson, art 10(2) is based on the ‘albeit rebuttable’ presumption that art 
10(1) prevails over the (non-Convention) interests of others in the first place.174 To the 
contrary, recognising reputation as a positive aspect of another human right, in this case 
property, requires a fair balancing of conflicting equal rights rather than presuming that art 
10(1) prevails.175 Additionally, as discussed in section V, States have a positive obligation to 
ensure the protection of rights enshrined in the ECHR between private parties. This imposes 
an obligation on them to take positive action to protect an individual from interference by 
other parties. According to Oster:176 
It is…important to notice that perceiving a corporation’s reputation as being rooted in 
property [in A1P1], does not coercively entail that a company deserves less protection for its 
reputation than a human being. To attach to corporate reputation a mere ‘instrumental 
purpose’ and thereby argue for a lesser degree of protection than for a human being’s 
reputation misconceives the significance of the protection of property as a fundamental right. 
 Finally, it is arguable that attaching a human rights value to a corporation’s reputation 
acts as an effective rejoinder to the argument that the possible ‘mismatch of resources’177 or 
‘inequality of arms’178 between an affluent corporate claimant and a small defendant 
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newspaper or an impecunious individual justifies making it more difficult, or even 
impossible, for corporations to sue for defamation. The threat of costly and protracted legal 
proceedings by company claimants, and the stifling effect on public debate that results from 
such proceedings, should be addressed by reform to civil litigation funding and costs, rather 
than limiting a company’s substantive rights.179 Dealing with the issue in this way would 
serve to alleviate some of the concerns of a ‘chilling effect’ on free speech that may stem 
from corporate reputation being the subject of positive ECHR rights by virtue A1P1. At the 
same time, it offers a mechanism for bodies trading for profit to protect what is not only a 
valuable asset, but is also, particularly in the context of the very many smaller businesses, 
vitally important for their survival.  Thus, it is submitted that the conceptual foundations of 
property, and A1P1, dictate that businesses’ reputations are deserving of protection against 
defamatory imputations. In the modern-day world of neo-liberal economics, it is not 
unrealistic to treat corporate reputation as a form property for the purposes of A1P1. It would 
then follow that real benefits (as set out in section V of this article) would accrue to 
businesses, regardless of size, in the sense that they would have a positive ECHR right which 
the State would be bound to safeguard. Furthermore, this would enable businesses to take 
appropriate enforcement action against the State to enforce the right. Consequently, and in 
conclusion, in this context, any legislation akin to the Australian Defamation Act 2005, 
discussed above in section III, should be regarded as a violation of the right to reputation as 
property pursuant to A1P1. 180 Indeed, if the right to reputation was unequivocally treated as 
an aspect of property, and therefore subsumed within the ambit of A1P1, this would 
potentially subject section 1 of the Defamation Act 2013 to human rights scrutiny due to the 
difficulty in demonstrating actual or likely serious financial loss which, due to its complete 
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lack of clarity, and the confusion it has generated is, arguably, an impediment to justice.181 In 
turn, this could open the door for possible reform of the provision to ensure its compliance 
with the ECHR. 
Endnote: The authors would like to thank JETL’s anonymous reviewers for their helpful 
comments on earlier drafts of this paper. The usual disclaimer applies. 
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